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DATE 21 February 1962

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THIS DOCUMENT CONTAINS INFORMATION PERTAINING TO
PROJECT IDEALIST: HANDLE VIA CONTROL SYSTEM.

25X1A2G

NRO REVIEW COMPLETED

THIS DOCUMENT CONTAINS CODE WORD MATERIAL

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25X1A9A

. The Board of Inquiry reconvened on 21 February 1962

at 10:35 a.m. [] who appeared as a witness on 20 February,
took the stand and was reminded that he was still under oath. The meeting
continued as follows:

25X1A9A

MR. HOUSTON: [] during the time Mr. Powers was under

25X1A6A

your command at [] was there anything in his personal life or affairs that
raised any question in your mind as to his suitability for the performance of the
missions he finally undertook over Russia?

25X1A9A

[] My answer will have to ^{be} "no" to that, otherwise I
certainly would never have let him go on this mission. There were certain rumors,
certain hearsay things that you hear in any number of places. I have tried not to
let rumors or hearsay influence any decisions I make. However, there are times
that I feel hearsay and rumors should be checked into to see if this is actually the
truth. As I say, knowing ^{that} the rumors had been just that -- and after this talk with
Mr. Powers I followed him very closely - very closely. In fact, I increased my
flying time with him -- increased the number of times that I flew with him, and I
observed his landings and take-offs in the U-2 much more closely than I had in the
past. And I reviewed his training missions. And I could see no difference whatsoever,
and I am confident in my own mind that this did not affect his flying.

JUDGE PRETTYMAN: I think perhaps for the record, Colonel, you
better identify, generally, the type of rumor or hearsay that you have been referring

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to in this testimony. As I understand, it was -- well, I'll let you state it.

Because where it appears on the record there might be some misunderstanding that these might be rumors about his reliability as a pilot, or something of that sort.

25X1A9A

The rumors were in the area of his personal life.

The rumors I had heard--

JUDGE PRETTYMAN: You needn't describe the rumors, just place them

in the general area.

25X1A9A

It was not a rumor, I would say it was hearsay.

I don't want to leave the impression this was talked about by everybody on the Base.

This was not the case at all. In my own opinion I doubt if there were over two

FOIAB6

people on the Base that had any knowledge of this at all.

FOIAB6

MR. HOUSTON: This line of questioning is directed solely to the

problem whether there was any personal strain that in your opinion might have

affected his performance.

25X1A9A

No, I'm confident in my own mind this caused no

personal strain whatsoever on him. It did not affect his flying -- I'm sure of that

in my own mind.

25X1A9A

MR. HOUSTON:

we will a little later on put in

precise information as to other missions performed by Mr. Powers at one time or

another, but some missions were performed while he was under your command, aside from

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this final mission?

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[] Well, in addition to the training missions--

MR. HOUSTON: I don't mean specifics.

25X1A9A

[] There were other missions flown.

MR. HOUSTON: I would just like your general appraisal of his

performance on those missions.

25X1A9A

[] I cannot tell you exactly how many -- I would probably

need to go back to the operational records to determine whether or not he actually

flew other missions. To the best of my knowledge I'm almost sure he flew at least

one other mission, maybe more, during the period of time I was there.

MR. HOUSTON: You had no reason to question his performance?

25X1A9A

[] No reason.

MR. HOUSTON: When you got notification of this mission which he

performed toward the end of April, you got this in the normal manner from Head-

quarters?

25X1A9A

[] This is correct.

MR. HOUSTON: Did you personally make the selection of pilots

to be available for this mission?

25X1A9A

[] Yes, I selected a primary and an alternate.

MR. HOUSTON: And these were Mr. Powers and []

25X1A9A

25X1A9A

[] No, if I remember correctly for this particular

mission this was Mr. Powers and [] (phonetic). To the best of my knowledge

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25X1A9A

right now, I believe it was []

MR. HOUSTON: Did you notify them personally?

25X1A9A

[] Yes.

MR. HOUSTON: And did you tell them the general nature of the

mission at that time?

25X1A9A

[] No, I didn't tell them the general nature of the

mission. As I recall, the prime reason for notifying these people was so that they could start their training, so they could start their route study.

MR. HOUSTON: Was there anything unusual about this mission, as

you viewed it?

25X1A9A

[] No.

MR. HOUSTON: Was there any particular basis on which you selected

these two pilots?

25X1A9A

[] Well, Powers' training records and past performances,

as far as I was concerned was outstanding. In flying this bird there is a requirement to fly very close to the designated route. This is not easily done, because it takes clear weather and being as high as you are and not being able to see out very well they have to use the drift sight method of being able to see the ground. Now this isn't too easy to fly, nor is it too easy to determine exactly where you are on the ground, or if there is a combination of things that could go a little bit wrong, that would maybe throw you a little bit ^{far} off your track, so to speak, it may not enable you to get the best pictures possible -- so that we endeavored to fly this

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track, training missions or otherwise, as closely as possible to the designated track in order to insure that the results would be as good as we possibly could make them. Mr. Powers' records indicated that he was exceptionally good at this. His records showed that he followed these very closely. Based on this and his over-all flying ability, this was one of the reasons that I selected him.

MR. HOUSTON: Aside from technical difficulty, is this type of flying and duration of flights physically taxing?

25X1A9A

Yes, it's always taxing -- but there again this is one of the purposes of a training mission -- this is another reason we need to do training, in order to stay in condition and be familiar with the circumstances and condition yourself to such hardships that come about.

MR. HOUSTON: And you felt he had the stamina and was so conditioned?

25X1A9A

Yes. He proved this in the training missions.

MR. HOUSTON: Did you accompany the group to the staging area?

25X1A9A

Yes.

25X1A9A MR. HOUSTON: Did you stay with them until the mission took off?

Yes.

25X1A9A MR. HOUSTON: And you had a chance to observe Powers closely during this time?

Yes. In addition to this I had a fully qualified flight surgeon that was available also, who monitored his actions very closely.

MR. HOUSTON: And there was nothing during the period in the staging

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area that raised any question in your mind--

25X1A9A

[] No, there was no question.

MR. HOUSTON: What part did you play in the briefing of the pilots

for this--

25X1A9A

[] Well, as I say, the pilots were usually already

briefed. They had gone through the training portion of the mission. However, due

to certain circumstances some parts of this could be changed at the last moment.

As I recall, there were no significant changes at the last moment on this. If there

had been this is the time that I would personally see that the pilot was briefed and

that he understood the changes completely. I ensured that the pilot would study,

and I observed the pilot studying at the pre-strike staging base during the time he

was there.

MR. HOUSTON: Was there a good deal of information to absorb in

these studies?

25X1A9A

[] Well, I would say there is a possibility they could

probably fly without it very much, but the more knowledge he had of it maybe the

better job that he could do.

MR. HOUSTON: You mean of the exact pattern of the mission, the

navigation problems to be involved--

25X1A9A

[] In other words, at what time and in what position do

you put on one switch and take the other switch off.

MR. HOUSTON: He would have these as written instructions to check

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as he went along, too?

25X1A9A

[] This was part of the briefing guide. I also asked if there were any specific questions or problems he had, was there anything there that was not clear in his own mind as to what he was to exactly do. This was part of the briefing.

MR. HOUSTON: Did you personally talk to him at all about the possibility of emergencies, landing accidents, and what to do in that event?

25X1A9A

[] Yes. I personally went over with him, and the navigator, to ensure that he understood the different routes and the different locations along his route as to which would be his best exit, and which bases he would probably have a better chance of reaching under certain circumstances.

MR. HOUSTON: Did you actually talk about the possibility of landing in enemy territory?

25X1A9A

[] As I recall at this particular time, this would have been taken care of before the pre-staging.

MR. HOUSTON: So you don't recall actually discussing it with him?

25X1A9A

[] Actually discussing with him what he would do if he went down in enemy territory - at the pre-strike base. This is a staging base. In other words, there is a pre-strike and a post-strike. The one that you take off from is the pre-strike, and the one that you return to and land is the post-strike.

MR. HOUSTON: Were you the first one to inform Powers this was a flight over Russia?

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25X1A9A

[] Yes.

MR. HOUSTON: Did you notice any particular reaction to that?

25X1A9A

[] Well, I don't think it was anything unusual, as I

recall, other than the fact that he seemed to be pleased, he seemed to be enthusiastic.

MR. HOUSTON: You didn't notice any hesitation?

25X1A9A

[] No hesitation, definitely not. This is one of the

things I always look for. If there is any hesitation at all, of course, then this

is a different matter entirely.

25X1A9A

[] Any reason why he was pleased?

25X1A9A

[] I don't think so, other than the fact that he has

an opportunity now to fly.

25X1A9A

[] Had he ever flown over the USSR before?

25X1A9A

[] To the best of my knowledge, no. This would have to

be checked in the operational records, but to the best of my knowledge at the time

I was there he had not flown over Soviet territory.

MR. HOUSTON: The group as a whole knew that in addition to the peripheral or border flights that there were overflights over Soviet Russia to be undertaken from time to time ? Did the pilot group as a whole know that in addition to the peripheral border flights from time to time there were to be overflights over Russia? They all knew they might be engaged--

[] This is true. This was part of their job.

25X1A9A

MR. HOUSTON: Did they think of this as a choice flight or all a

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part of their business?

25X1A9A

I think they would consider this a choice flight.

MR. HOUSTON: Any one of them would have been glad to get this

assignment?

25X1A9A

Yes.

25X1A9A

This would indicate the reason for his pleasure?

25X1A9A

This is true.

MR. HOUSTON: During your command did you ever have any pilots

who wanted to be released from the program?

25X1A9A

No, and I asked this question several times --

in pilots' meetings where there was no one there but the pilots and myself.

MR. HOUSTON: Was there during this time any reduction in the

requirement for pilots?

25X1A9A

No, not that I know of, to my knowledge.

MR. HOUSTON: Did you discuss with Mr. Powers the possibility of

actual capture?

25X1A9A

Well, this of course was part of his training. I'm

sure that I discussed this to a degree with him, at least the point that he had

an option to take this device with him or not.

MR. HOUSTON: The needle?

25X1A9A

The needle. The other part of going down in enemy

territory would have been taken care of in his pre-flight training. In other words,

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at the home base. This is one of the reasons for letting a certain pilot know --

however, he would not necessarily have to be - because this is a continual

training that all of the pilots would go through.

25X1A6A

MR. HOUSTON: In their training at the principles of Operations

Policy Letter No. 6 would be given to them as part of their training?

25X1A9A

This is true, repeatedly.

MR. HOUSTON: Do you remember whether you actually read the letter

to them -- you or one of the other officers? Were the pilots actually shown that

letter, do you know?

25X1A9A

I'm not sure whether they were actually shown this

letter or not. My Intelligence Officer would be in a better position to say this,

I'm sure.

GENERAL BULL: I have a question related to that. As we have before

us now this Policy Memorandum No. 6 -- was that the name of it?

25X1A9A

Yes.

GENERAL BULL: That was a policy letter to guide people like you -

the unit commanders in the field - with some leeway on your part as to what you would

impart to the pilot.

25X1A9A

Yes, sir.

GENERAL BULL: Now did you follow that strictly? Any exceptions

to it that you know of -- in your own judgment - you didn't do that but you did do

this?

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25X1A9A.

[] We followed it very closely, and as far as I can recall I don't know of any exceptions to it.

GENERAL BULL: So the portions on destruction, and evasion, and what to do in event of capture, and general deportment, was passed on by you, as unit commander, to these pilots before they took off?

25X1A9A

[] I didn't personally pass it on to them, but they were passed on through my staff officers at these training sessions. And I talked with the pilots in general about certain items and certain activities, such as this needle, for instance -- I would personally ask if he wanted this or not.

COL. GEARY: Was there any question in your own mind as to the understanding on the part of these pilots as to the contents of this particular letter?

25X1A9A

[] No, there was no question.

COL. GEARY: You feel they all thoroughly understood the contents of this letter?

25X1A9A

[] Yes, I'm sure each did understand the letter.

MR. HOUSTON: Would they raise questions concerning the policy during the course of the training?

25X1A9A

[] To the best of my recollection they wanted to know for instance if this letter really meant what it said -- all I'm saying is that if they could they were to withhold information, but if they couldn't they were to tell the truth -- in other words, they wanted to be sure they understood this memorandum.

25X1A2G

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GENERAL BULL: Do you happen to know if there was any discussion-- in clearing up questions in the minds of the pilots-- discussions of things rather remotely connected with the flight -- where they might go, where they might be based, where they might escape to -- that involved other countries? Did that question come up and was it discussed in the briefing?

25X1A9A

[] Yes. All this was classified and they were briefed not to discuss it.

MR. HOUSTON: In the Policy Memorandum, as I recall, it was specifically set forth - that requirement insofar as possible to keep from giving the full specifications of the plane's performance at a particular altitude and range, to play those down. Do you recall any other specific points they were briefed to do everything they could to protect? I'm thinking now of knowledge -- these pilots would have had knowledge of overflights over other countries, wouldn't they?

25X1A9A

[] Not necessarily. There might be some flights flown that some of the pilots would not know about - there would be no reason for them to know about.

MR. HOUSTON: If they knew about that participation in the program by other countries were they briefed not to say this?

25X1A9A

[] To the extent this policy in Letter No. 6 goes, that wherever possible to withhold, but if they could not withhold then they would tell the truth.

GENERAL BULL: Do you recall that in the pre-flight briefing of

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25X1A9A

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Powers immediately before the mission whether or not he raised any questions at all on an understanding of his mission? Did he come forth and say: "I want to hear more about this? I need more information on that. Or just precisely what does this mean?

25X1A9A

There was a policy I had that prior to the pilot going on this mission - at the pre-strike base I always asked if there was any question about his mission or were there any parts of his mission that he did not understand.

GENERAL BULL: The question was, were there any such parts that

Powers raised in this instance?

25X1A9A

To the best of my knowledge there were none.

GENERAL BULL: And he had the opportunity, you know?

25X1A9A

He had the opportunity, yes.

JUDGE PRETTYMAN: Colonel, as I understand it part of his instructions --

possibly the most important part -- on which he was briefed was a map - a flight map they call it.

25X1A9A

Yes.

JUDGE PRETTYMAN: Now that map indicated where he was supposed to fly -- it was outlined on the map where he was supposed to go on this mission, is that correct?

25X1A9A

This is true.

JUDGE PRETTYMAN: And he was instructed, because of the nature of the plane and the mission and whatnot, to fly as close to that designated line as possible?

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25X1A9A

Correct.

JUDGE PRETTYMAN: So that while he was on the mission if he was on the line indicated on his map he was carrying out orders -- and that was no choice of his, is that correct?

25X1A9A

This is true.

JUDGE PRETTYMAN: The fall where the plane came down was close to the indicated flight line on the map?

25X1A9A

Well, not having the map here and not really knowing exactly where the plane came down, I'd hesitate to answer this. But there was a route map drawn, and if we can determine where the plane came down then I possibly could answer this.

MR. HOUSTON: Judge, excuse me, but the Intelligence Officer will describe the actual map, and then of course we will have information this afternoon on what we know about where the plane came down, as well as the corroborating information from whatever source we can get it.

JUDGE PRETTYMAN: We will leave it with the Colonel, then, that if the information that we get shows that the plane came down at or close to the flight line that was on that map that Powers had then it's clear that he was at that spot pursuant to his instructions and orders and not by any voluntary decision of his own.

25X1A9A

This is true. In other words, he had a route to fly, and he was instructed to fly this route, and if he could determine that he was off

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course, so to speak, that he would take corrective action to get back on course.

MR. HOUSTON: Do I understand it was commonly the case you would have deviations you would have to correct?

25X1A9A

[] As I said before, if you are flying visually and there happens to be a cloud cover beneath and you could not see the ground, then there is a very good chance that you could deviate from this route without knowing it. Now once it becomes clear and you can see the ground and you can determine your exact position on the ground and you know it's a fact that you are off course - then he should take corrective action to put himself back on course.

MR. HOUSTON: The point I'm making is that in the experience of flying these missions was it not common to find some deviation that needed correction?

25X1A9A

[] Yes, because of such instances as I just cited -- this could cause a deviation.

JUDGE PRETTYMAN: We have no further questions.

25X1A9A

25X1A9A

. . . . [] was then excused and []

was called as the next witness and duly sworn by Judge Prettyman

MR. HOUSTON: Would you identify yourself for the record?

25X1A9A

[]

25X1A9A

MR. HOUSTON: [] at what time were you associated with the U-2 Project?

25X1A9A

[] From 1958 to 1960.

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MR. HOUSTON: In what capacity?

25X1A9A

☐ I was assigned as Intelligence Officer for Base B.

MR. HOUSTON: Did you have prior intelligence training experience?

25X1A9A

☐ Yes.

MR. HOUSTON: Would you describe it, very briefly?

25X1A9A

☐ Well, I had been an Air Force Intelligence Officer since 1950, and attended the prescribed intelligence training courses of the Air Force, Strategic Intelligence School here in Washington, and experience in SAC as Wing Intelligence Officer, and in Germany as Wing Intelligence Officer.

MR. HOUSTON: Were you assigned to the U-2 Project back here to go direct - or did you go directly--

25X1A9A

☐ I was assigned to go to B.

MR. HOUSTON: And you arrived out there when?

25X1A9A

☐ I think it was March of 1958 -- the latter part of March or the first part of April.

MR. HOUSTON: Mr. Powers was with the Detachment at that time?

25X1A9A

☐ Yes.

MR. HOUSTON: And during the period you were there did you know

Powers?

25X1A9A

☐ Yes, sir.

25X1A9A

MR. HOUSTON: Both officially and socially?

☐ Yes.

25X1A2G

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MR. HOUSTON: Had you briefed him on any missions prior to the

April 1960 mission?

25X1A9A

I think so. As to any specific mission, I don't

think I could recall any specific mission. But in the normal nature of things I

would have been involved, yes, sir.

MR. HOUSTON: Were you the Intelligence Officer for the specific

mission that was planned for late April and took place on 1 May?

25X1A9A

Yes.

MR. HOUSTON: Did you accompany the pilots and groups to the staging

area?

25X1A9A

No.

MR. HOUSTON: Did you brief the pilots before they left the staging

area?

25X1A9A

Yes, I did.

MR. HOUSTON: Could you tell us the nature of the briefing?

25X1A9A

Well, we had it pretty well established as a routine,

as to things we would cover on the pre-flight briefings, and after the pilot assignments

were made, and some of the preliminary planning had gone into the route anyhow, I

would get the assigned pilots into my office and we would use the available target

identification charts that we had. They were generally mosaics, fairly large scale

maps, for identification of targeting. And in the absence of any detailed photography

or mosaic maps we would study the JN charts they use for their navigation, or larger

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scale, if possible, and try to ensure they knew a specific flight path so they would cover the flight area.

25X1A9A What is a JN map?

25X1A9A A jet navigation map -- a small scale map.

In addition to that, my function was more closely allied with target identification. And then we would run over evasion and escape, limited enemy or unfriendly country ability to interfere with the mission--

MR. HOUSTON: In that regard the capabilities of any enemy fighters, surface-to-air missiles?

25X1A9A Yes, surface-to-air missiles and antiaircraft

weapons. I say "limited" because over the scale of the routes they were flying there wasn't much point in getting too detailed on the thing -- but more of an awareness than anything else. Procedures to be adopted in the event of capture. What alternative methods the pilots had for regaining friendly territory. Pretty well standardized Air Force procedures insofar as who to contact, who not to contact. A degree of terrain study, climatic and geographic conditions, and security aspects only insofar as prisoner of war activity. Then we also covered or identified the necessity for carrying only the minimum documents necessary for flying the mission. And also we covered in general this Policy Letter 6 that we have been referring to.

MR. HOUSTON: Do you recall whether you actually had the Policy Letter 6 before you at that time?

25X1A9A Specifically in regard to Mr. Powers I do recall

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discussing this with him. As to whether the Letter was actually in front of him at the time, or in front of me at the time, I don't recall. I do know that of all the pilots I talked to I was never in any doubt that they knew what the contents of this Letter were.

MR. HOUSTON: In the discussions they revealed a thorough understanding, in your opinion?

25X1A9A

[] Yes, sir. In fact, they seemed to know it better than I did -- they had been associated with the Project longer and seemed to be more knowledgeable on it than I at one point.

MR. HOUSTON: Do you believe you spoke specifically at this briefing to Powers about what to do in event of capture?

25X1A9A

[] Yes, sir.

MR. HOUSTON: And in so doing do you believe you spoke in accordance with the policy laid down in ^{Policy} Memorandum No. 6?

25X1A9A

[] That was a part of it, yes.

MR. HOUSTON: Do you remember any other specifics?

25X1A9A

[] Well, we followed a practice -- at least I did -- of telling the pilots that if they were captured that they were of course to attempt not to reveal any information at all, if possible -- and this usually degenerated into a fairly general discussion as to ways and means. We would discuss Air Force experience with PW's, and the fact that eventually almost anyone could be broken down and compelled to talk -- and that the tactics should be to delay -- not an

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out-and-out lie if you're going to get caught in it, but delay your interrogators as much as possible -- give him a limited amount of information and specifics. As to the aircraft itself I do recall a discussion as to limitation of altitude and performance of the aircraft. Whether this was emphasized unduly or not, I don't really remember, but I was sure that this took place.

MR. HOUSTON: Do you recall whether you discussed any theory of behavior as being better than another? For instance, that to be silent under questioning or to be apparently forthright under questioning would be a better approach?

25X1A9A

☐ We discussed this, yes, sir -- and again the general idea was there would be no point in being belligerent, to appear cooperative, to give limited amounts of information under pressure -- in other words, to fence with this man to the extent of trying to keep him off you but not to the extent where you're lying to him and you're going to get trapped in your own lies -- to know what you were going to say and to say it.

MR. HOUSTON: Do you remember whether you discussed any vital information that Mr. Powers might have that was considered particularly sensitive?

25X1A9A

☐ Specific in terms of information? No, sir, I don't recall.

MR. HOUSTON: What I had in mind is that I believe he had information on certain other overflights and participation of other governments in the U-2 Project that were considered pretty sensitive. Do you recall whether you discussed those at all, as things that should be protected above the ordinary?

25X1A9A

☐ As to specifics, I don't recall. I do know that

25X1A2G

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generally the idea was to attempt to keep from revealing any knowledge he did have or had gained, and that he should be very much aware of this knowledge.

MR. HOUSTON: What I'm thinking of, there was some information that in event of capture would be obvious to the Russians, and on this he was under no inhibition particularly--

25X1A9A

[] Right, sir.

MR. HOUSTON: What I'm thinking of - there were degrees of sensitivity of the things discussed with him--

25X1A9A

[] Yes, there were certain items, I do know, with this idea of holding back.

25X1A9A

[] You have already identified the performance of the aircraft as one area to be withheld if possible.

25X1A9A

[] Yes, sir.

25X1A9A

[] Any other technical aspects -- the competence of the American cameras?

25X1A9A

[] Yes, this was not to be discussed, if at all possible.

This was part of the technical data of the aircraft. Of course, the assumption was the cameras would be destroyed with the destruct and there wouldn't be any problems.

25X1A9A

[] Was this an assumption?
a
It was/pretty well-understood thing the destruction

of the aircraft would take care of this and the pilot would be relieved, therefore, of really facing this problem. However, I recall -- I don't know whether I talked

25X1A2G

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to Powers specifically on this -- I don't know -- but I do know in discussing capture with some of the pilots I had no doubt they were well aware a discussion of the functioning of the equipment was something they should not discuss, and most of them -- well, I'm sure they were well aware of this.

JUDGE PRETTYMAN: How much did the pilots know about the camera equipment?

25X1A9A

[] From a formalized sense I imagine a rather limited degree of knowledge. However, in association with it and having seen some of the results of it they could draw some pretty good conclusions on it.

JUDGE PRETTYMAN: They weren't briefed on the structure and capacities and what not of the camera?

25X1A9A

[] To my knowledge, no, sir. They were briefed as to what they had to do to make the thing function.

JUDGE PRETTYMAN: That would be the extent of their briefing?

25X1A9A

[] To my knowledge, yes.

JUDGE PRETTYMAN: They were going to fly certain missions and do certain things, and the plane was loaded so that if they moved certain levers it would do certain things.

25X1A9A

[] Yes, sir. Our emphasis insofar as the camera was concerned was that they ensure it was turned off and on at the specified times.

JUDGE PRETTYMAN: Could one of these pilots have sat down and sketched the structure of one of these cameras?

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25X1A9A

[]

I don't think they could.

MR. HOUSTON: In that connection, do you happen to know whether

Powers had any background or training in photography?

25X1A9A

[]

No, sir, I don't.

25X1A9A

[]

I understand that specifically Powers had seen the

results -- I think there was testimony to this effect yesterday -- that Powers had

seen or had probably seen the results of photographic surveillance, presumably as

a result of one of his own missions. Was this likely to be true?

25X1A9A

[]

Well, I don't think so. I don't know.

25X1A9A

[]

What I'm trying to get at was really whether a pilot

would normally be familiar with the state of the technical competence of the

photographic equipment and would appreciate the degree of excellence of this

photography and would generally be familiar with what this photographic equipment

could accomplish at the altitudes at which it was functioning.

25X1A9A

[]

I think they would be aware of the fine equipment

that they did have at their disposal.

COL. GEARY: Do you happen to know if this testimony -- was this

a result of a training mission that they showed him--

25X1A9A

[]

I think somebody testified yesterday that Powers didn't

know much about the technical make-up of the cameras and photographic equipment but

that he had seen the result of the photography and therefore was aware of the most

sensitive aspect of this Project, and that was the very high degree of technical

25X1A2G

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competence which had been accomplished.

MR. HOUSTON: I think the testimony was that he had seen the results of training flights.

25X1A9A

This I think was probably correct.

JUDGE PRETTYMAN: Let me pin down this one further thing. Assume that the pilots knew or certainly assumed that if they were instructed to fly a certain height over a certain territory, and pull certain levers which they knew operated cameras, they assumed they were taking pictures and the pictures were good enough to cause the command to send somebody to do that. In addition to that, so far as you know, they didn't know anything about the technical, mechanical make-up of the camera?

25X1A9A

I doubt it seriously.

JUDGE PRETTYMAN: Or of the paper that was used?

25X1A9A

No, sir. Most of them were interested in the fact that we have a good piece of equipment here and it will turn in the results we are after -- and that was about the extent of the feeling.

MR. HOUSTON: Do you recall whether or not you briefed Powers on what specific enemy capability he might expect to encounter in the way of fighter aircraft or surface-to-air missiles and their probable effectiveness?

25X1A9A

Yes, sir. The information that Mr. Powers received was as to types of aircraft, types of fighter aircraft, and as to possible types of surface-to-air missiles. As to precise location of these, no. As to performance

25X1A2G

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25X1A9A

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capabilities of the fighters, yes.

JUDGE PRETTYMAN: What was he told about the possibility of

his being shot down?

25X1A9A

[] That it was rather remote.

MR. HOUSTON: Not impossible, but remote?

25X1A9A

[] That the possibility existed and that the knowledge

we had at that particular time indicated that there was very little likelihood,

or practically none, of a fighter intercept. There was some likelihood, but remote,

^a
of/surface-to-air missile.

JUDGE PRETTYMAN: Not air-to-air missile?

25X1A9A

[] No, sir.

MR. HOUSTON: Do you happen to recall whether Sverdlovsk was

mentioned as a possible SAM site? Surface-to-air missile site.

25X1A9A

[] Yes, sir. I'd like to amend that somewhat. In

the briefing since the route was all established we ran over the entire route, and

Sverdlovsk of course happened to be there, and it was annotated as a possible missile

site, but that was just a part of the general briefing - no particular point was made

of it.

JUDGE PRETTYMAN: Was it known to intelligence -- known to you at

that point that while a surface-to-air missile site so far as he was concerned, where

he was going to fly and at what height, that a surface-to-air was a possibility?

25X1A9A

[] I think at that time, sir, as far as my knowledge was

25X1A2G

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25X1A9A

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concerned, it was considered a remote possibility but a possibility.

25X1A9A Did he understand the significance of this, to
your knowledge?

25X1A9A Of surface-to-air missiles?

25X1A9A Yes.

25X1A9A I'm sure he did, but I don't think that he or any
other pilots were particularly concerned about ground offenses. They had great
faith in the aircraft, they had great faith in the planning of these missions, and
I don't really think that many of them were deeply concerned about defensive activity.
They were aware of it but not concerned particularly.

MR. HOUSTON: Did I understand you to say that you were the one
that briefed him on what should accompany him in the form of documentation?

25X1A9A Generally, yes, sir.

MR. HOUSTON: What was he authorized to carry in the way of
identification documents?

25X1A9A What was he authorized?

MR. HOUSTON: Let me start off -- was he instructed not to have
any identification?

25X1A9A No, sir. I'm trying to remember, and I can't
remember specifically what he was instructed not to carry or to carry. He was
to have his identification as a -- and this is something I'm not too sure of -- I
think it was as a civilian--

25X1A2G

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25X1A9A

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25X1A9A

MR. HOUSTON: Would you recognize this card, Major? [] Mr.

25X1A9A Houston handed [] a photograph_7

[] Yes, sir. This is what I'm referring to -- not DAF.

JUDGE PRETTYMAN: Let's describe it for the record.

25X1A9A

MR. HOUSTON: I showed [] a photograph of a card which

appears in a group of photographs in the publication entitled "The Trial of the U-2" put out by Translation World Publishers, which, from its photograph, is identified as a Department of Air Force civilian identification card bearing the name -- and there is a partial obliteration but c-i-s G. Powers -- the first four letters of Francis are eliminated. This is a description of the picture. Was this card one he was authorized to take with him?

25X1A9A

[] You use the term "authorized", and I'm not sure in

my own mind as to what -- I'm trying to recall -- what specific documentation an individual was authorized, what the form was or which. They had two forms, as I recall, one was the normal Air Force ID card and the other was a NASA-type card, and specifically as to which of those two was authorized, or which he was told was authorized, I really can't say -- but going back two years, I would say in order to keep the Air Force out of it it would have been the NASA card he would have been authorized.

JUDGE PRETTYMAN: Well, if he was found with this card on him after the flight, would you say that the card had been authorized? Was this one of the cards that would have been authorized?

25X1A2G

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25X1A9A

[] I can't answer -- I can't say that.

JUDGE PRETTYMAN: In other words, you cannot tell us whether or

not he was authorized to have this card?

25X1A9A

[] No, sir, I can't recall whether he was or was not.

25X1A9A

[] Did he have a NASA ID card?

25X1A9A

[] Whether Mr. Powers had that or not, I don't know.

I know that the pilots did have NASA cards.

25X1A9A

[] Was his cover story NASA?

25X1A9A

[] Yes, as an all-weather aircraft.

25X1A9A

[] Did you brief him on his cover story?

25X1A9A

[] Yes -- this was Policy Letter 6.

25X1A9A

[] And this was NASA -- he was to say he was a NASA

pilot?

25X1A9A

[] I haven't seen that Policy Letter for two years,

and I don't recall what it said.

25X1A9A

[] The question here is the cover story that he was to

adopt inside Russia. The cover story he used in other parts of the world might

well be one thing -- he might say he was a NASA pilot under certain circumstances --

but you might give him different instructions as to how to behave and what to say

if he were picked up in hostile territory. And the question here is: What documents

was he authorized to carry and which story was he instructed to tell to the Russians?

25X1A9A

[] Well, as you are aware, the way that thing goes there

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are several different possibilities in that Policy Letter on the cover story he would use, depending on various circumstances, and as to which one - right now I can't tell you that it was No. 1, No. 2, or No. 3 he was instructed to say or to tell. But I do know that in general I think I can say that he was instructed to tell that story appropriate to that overflight, and had an understanding of that Policy Letter.

25X1A9A But you don't remember specifically what he was told with respect to a cover story for use inside Soviet Russia?

25X1A9A No, sir.

JUDGE PRETTYMAN: Is there any record anywhere as to exactly what instructions he was given at this time for this particular flight?

25X1A9A I don't know, sir. There were several reports that were written at that time, and the full content of those reports may reveal that. But I don't recall specifically. And really in my own mind I'm not particularly sure of the full, detailed cover story as written, although I read the thing several times and knew at that time, but right now I can't recall the details of it.

25X1A9A But you are reasonably certain that there was a cover story?

25X1A9A Yes, sir.

25X1A9A And your difficulty now is simply in remembering it?

25X1A9A Yes, in remembering what the details of that story were.

JUDGE PRETTYMAN: Well, there isn't any way that you know of by which

25X1A2G

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25X1A9A

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you could take the story that Powers told when he was captured and check it back against what his instructions were?

25X1A9A

[] From the published newspaper-type things and the trial itself I do recall that at that particular time in listening to the radio broadcasts there was no particular concern on my part that he had deviated from the story he was told to give -- at that particular time -- I remember this distinctly - he was following in general the story that he was told to give under the circumstances -- in other words, I didn't get the impression that he was violating it.

JUDGE PRETTYMAN: What instruction was he given as to what his status would be if he came down in Russian territory on this flight?

25X1A9A

[] That he was a civilian pilot and had wandered off course, and was on a weather reconnaissance mission, as I recall the first part of it.

JUDGE PRETTYMAN: That was his instruction as to what his status actually was?

25X1A9A

[] Oh, what his actual status was?

JUDGE PRETTYMAN: When he came down. He didn't have a prisoner of war status, did he?

25X1A9A

[] Oh no. That his status when he hit the ground was that of practically nothing -- that he was on his own at that point.

JUDGE PRETTYMAN: I wonder if they told him, in connection with his status if he came down on the ground, what his rights were?

25X1A9A

[] He was told in discussing this with him that he was

25X1A2G

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25X1A9A

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on his own insofar as any rights were concerned -- he had no Geneva Convention rights or anything of that nature - he was strictly on his own -- there was no POW status as such.

JUDGE PRETTYMAN: I assume or I suppose this would probably be obvious - that the height at which he was to fly was part of his instruction?

25X1A9A

Yes, sir.

JUDGE PRETTYMAN: Anything further?

MR. HOUSTON: Two points. Was he briefed on POW communication techniques?

25X1A9A

Not by me, no, sir.

MR. HOUSTON: Did you personally discuss with him the carrying of the poison needle and its utilization?

25X1A9A

Yes, sir.

MR. HOUSTON: What did you tell him about it?

25X1A9A

I told him that the needle was there, and it was his option to take it or not to take it, it was his option to use it or not to use it. We took the device apart and suggested that there were several methods of using the thing. As far as concealment, that as a good luck charm it may be allowed on him -- the interrogator or the captors would allow him to keep it as a good luck charm. But that there was an alternative, that he could take the pin portion out and put it in the hem of his clothing, or something of this nature. That he could use it as a self-destruction device or as a weapon, if the occasion called for it, and at his own

25X1A2G

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option -- it was strictly his option as to how he handled it.

MR. HOUSTON: Was it also his option as to whether or not he took

it along?

25X1A9A

☐ Yes, sir.

MR. HOUSTON: Did he express any personal views as to the needle

and its use?

25X1A9A

☐ I hesitate to answer specifically, because I don't

recall -- I know that in discussing it with all the pilots there were several views expressed, and as to what Frank's actual view was, I would hesitate to be specific and say whether it was use it or not use it.

MR. HOUSTON: You just don't recall?

25X1A9A

☐ No. There were several strong feelings on both sides of the fence as far as the device itself was concerned.

MR. HOUSTON: It might help to refresh your recollection -- I'd

like to read from OPERATIONS POLICY LETTER NO. 6 (dated 9 December 1957), paragraph 4.c., on the conduct and procedures in event of capture, as to their status:

(Reading) "They (the pilots) will be advised to represent themselves as civilians, to admit previous Air Force affiliation, to admit current CIA employment, and to make no attempt to deny the nature of their mission."

25X1A9A

☐ Yes -- this is what I didn't remember - whether the CIA part was a part of that instruction.

MR. HOUSTON: It is my understanding that the NASA story would be used in other circumstances.

25X1A2G

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25X1A9A [] Yes, this is true. As I said, there were two or three different alternatives, and I don't recall the line of demarkation between the two.

MR. HOUSTON: This is the specific language in event of capture, as such.

25X1A9A [] I don't have any doubt that that was understood.

JUDGE PRETTYMAN: Anything further?

25X1A9A

25X1A9A [] I can't remember, Judge, whether [] was asked whether Powers showed any hesitation or manifested any concern about this particular flight which was in any way unusual. If this question has not been asked, I would like to ask it now. Do you recall--

25X1A9A [] No, sir.

JUDGE PRETTYMAN: Is your answer no that you don't remember, or no that he didn't exhibit any--

25X1A9A [] No, he did not exhibit any reluctance to take the mission.

JUDGE PRETTYMAN: The witness is excused.

25X1A9A

25X1A9A

. . . . [] then left the stand and [] was called as the next witness and duly sworn by Judge Prettyman

MR. HOUSTON: Would you identify yourself, please?

25X1A9A [] I am [] 25X1A9A

25X1A2G

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25X1A9A

MR. HOUSTON: What was your relationship to the U-2 Program?

[] I was the flight planner at the Detachment in

25X1A6A

[] -- the navigator.

MR. HOUSTON: When were you assigned, when did you reach there,

and how long were you there?

25X1A6A

25X1A9A

[] I arrived in [] in December of 1959 and I remained there until March of 1961.

MR. HOUSTON: During that time you were responsible for planning

the actual flight tracks for missions?

25X1A9A

[] Yes, sir.

MR. HOUSTON: And briefing the pilots on these missions and the

flight pattern?

25X1A9A

[] Yes, sir.

MR. HOUSTON: Were you responsible in connection with the overflight

mission that was originally set up for the end of April and took place on 1 May?

25X1A9A

[] Yes, sir, I was.

25X1A9A

MR. HOUSTON: Tell us a little how it worked, [] You

would get instructions from Headquarters -- how specifically, and what would you

do with them?

25X1A9A

[] The instructions came to us in a message which we

called an HB-21 message. Headquarters had listed all the geographic coordinates

of turning points after departure base -- all the turning points -- and of course the

25X1A2G

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recovery base. They would give us instructions between various points as to where the camera should be turned on and off and the particular mode of operation for the camera. I then would take this message and plot on maps such as these, which are JN charts, the actual geographic positions of the various turning points, and letter them as they were designated in the message. These points would then be checked at least three different times by myself, and witnessed, and on all overflights

25X1A9A

25X1A9A

personally checked these coordinates to be sure the track we had drawn on these flight charts was the track Headquarters had sent us. We used different colors on the charts--

JUDGE PRETTYMAN: Let me understand this -- when the pilot took off on a flight his flight was indicated on a series of cards such as you have there? It was not on just one map but on a series of cards such as these?

25X1A9A

That is correct.

JUDGE PRETTYMAN: And the cards were numbered like those in front of you?

25X1A9A

Yes, sir, the number and showing the general direction.

Here for example on Chart 5 there was an arrow, so that the pilot could always orient the map so he was looking in the direction of the flight line and the general path of the aircraft. On this particular mission we used eight cards because of the length of the mission.

JUDGE PRETTYMAN: Actually four cards with charts on front and back.

25X1A9A

Yes - four. And these were orientated as far as

25X1A2G

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turning the switches on and off. And in addition to the orientations which are on these cards we would compute celestial navigation positions for him to use to observe with his sextant, and to be able to get his position celestially should there be an undercast condition which prevented him from visually fixing himself during the flight. In addition to this we also planned true heading checks for every four minutes of time throughout the entire mission, so that should the compass fail he could, by setting in the azimuth of the body, steer himself celestially throughout the mission.

JUDGE PRETTYMAN: Now actually on the date of this flight - May 1, 1960 - what was the condition? Was there an undercast or was the ground in sight for the entire flight or--

25X1A9A

[] Before take-off we obtained from Headquarters again the weather forecast for the route. We also obtained winds. And these winds were put on the pilot's green card or flight plan, and the annotations regarding the weather was placed on his chart.

JUDGE PRETTYMAN: On these charts - these cards?

25X1A9A

[] On these cards. And I actually don't know - it not being available -- but from an interview I have had with Mr. Powers he indicated cloud cover from departure base up to about this position [] pointing to [] on chart []. We debriefed him on that weather. We also had available to us from Headquarters' supply sources radio stations within the Soviet Union with our frequencies and call signs listed. These were placed on the chart and we were able

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25X1A2G

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to give him radio bearings to the stations, which he could use to determine his course or "track", as we call it, in the event of an undercast or sextant failure. And these were made available to the pilot.

25X1A9A

Now after the track had been checked out and certified that it was correct, at a time designated by [] the pilots were allowed to see this track and study it. Because the maps of the JN size or scale are not sufficient for proper target study, we then allowed the primary and the alternate pilot to make any target notations that he desired on his chart, since he was the man that was going to fly the mission and he could read his own writing better than mine, and any notations that he thought would help him we allowed him to place on these charts. And this they did. This was usually done at the Base at [] before we went into staging operation. But whenever we arrived at our advance base, the night before before the pilot went to sleep he reviewed his route and studied the targets and refreshed his memory with any notations that he wanted to, regarding the targets, at that time.

25X1A6A

JUDGE PRETTYMAN: When you say "targets" what do you mean? Do you mean the places at which he was to take the pictures?

25X1A9A

[] No, sir. But for example on this chart, which is Chart 5, you see we have a flat line that comes up and turns in this manner. Now on this map there may not be the actual annotation of a dam and a large lake, which appeared to us from other sources or from larger maps, or there may have been some buildings that we received target charts for which were of prime interest, and he would then annotate the building as it appeared in relation to airfields, towns, bridges, and

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he put it on this chart in pencil, so he was sure as he was flying along he could refresh his memory and line himself up with the building as he had placed it on the map.

JUDGE PRETTYMAN: Then when you use the word "target" in this connection what you mean is observable features on the ground which he could use to check his course so as to know whether he was on course or not?

25X1A9A

☐ Yes, sir.

JUDGE PRETTYMAN: You don't use it in regard to the places where he was supposed to take a picture?

25X1A9A

☐ No, sir. The camera was on all the time.

GENERAL BULL: They would just bring the charts up to date with the latest navigational data.

25X1A9A

☐ Yes, sir. These charts were several years old in some cases, and they were bringing them up to date, that is correct.

In the morning before the flight while the pilot was pre-breathing - which means that for at least two hours before scheduled take-off the pilot was breathing oxygen -- I took these mission charts and gave them to the pilot, and he studied them again, and if he had any recommendations or questions, or anything of this type, we would then bring his charts up to date for him -- but normally they didn't. We gave him then the actual time that it would take to fly a leg, the heading that he should fly -- and this was all stamped right on his chart so that he didn't have to refer back to his flight log, or if a flight log fell on the floor

25X1A2G

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25X1A9A

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and he couldn't pick it up -- as may have happened -- all of the data he needed to fly the mission was on the chart, although we did like to have him record some data for us, for debriefing purposes, on his flight card, which is and was referred to as the green card.

MR. HOUSTON: Had you briefed Mr. Powers on any other missions?

25X1A9A

☐

Yes, I had.

MR. HOUSTON: Did you find he understood his briefings?

25X1A9A

☐

Yes.

MR. HOUSTON: And did you debrief at the end of missions?

25X1A9A

☐

No, sir. The debriefing team was employed, for example on this mission while I was with the launching party, at ☐ the debriefing team was headed by other people, and ☐ as the Intelligence Officer was scheduled to go into ☐ to debrief him.

25X1A6A

25X1A9A

25X1A6A

COL. GEARY: Had you debriefed him on other occasions?

25X1A9A

☐

: Not other overflight missions, but I had debriefed him on training missions very often.

MR. HOUSTON: Did you form an opinion as to his navigational ability?

25X1A9A

☐

Yes. In my opinion Frank Powers was about the best pilot we had.

25X1A9A

☐

From a navigational sense, or overall?

25X1A9A

☐

Overall.

In addition to training missions there were times when he would

25X1A2G

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25X1A9A

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fly test flights for us after an aircraft engine had been changed, etc. And I know he was regarded in the Unit as about the best pilot we had.

25X1A9A

MR. HOUSTON: You were with him in the immediate period before take-off?

☐

Yes, I was.

MR. HOUSTON: Did you discuss with him anything besides the flight plan? Did you discuss any possibilities of mishap?

25X1A9A

☐

No, I didn't discuss any possibilities about any mishaps,

but I was the custodian of "the silver dollar", as we referred to it, on his transport

25X1A6A

25X1A6A

from ☐ and it was in my custody at the time we were in ☐ and

therefore just before Frank got into the aircraft I took the silver dollar from its

location and offered it to Frank. At first when I offered it to him there was a

hesitation on his part, and he shook his head indicating that he did not want to take

this--

MR. HOUSTON: Did he have his helmet on?

25X1A9A

☐

Yes, he had been pre-breathing for almost two hours

now. And as I started to walk away from him he then tapped me on the shoulder, and

I turned around, and he indicated he would take it, so I gave it to him and he put

it in his pocket of his flight suit. I then asked him again if there was anything on

the mission that he had any questions about, and he indicated everything was fine.

He took the flight packet which had his map and flight data with him and went out

and put it in the aircraft.

MR. HOUSTON: Did you accompany him to the aircraft?

25X1A2G

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25X1A9A

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25X1A9A

Well, I accompanied him part way to the aircraft --

maybe four or five steps. The aircraft was in the hangar and the pre-breathing van was in the hangar -- and he walked up the steps and I patted him on the back and said, "I'll see you later, Frank."

MR. HOUSTON: Were there any incidents in these final sessions, that come to your mind at all, that raised any question in your mind about the mission or about Powers?

25X1A9A

None whatsoever -- absolutely none.

25X1A9A

MR. HOUSTON: I have a paper here, forwarded over Mr.

25X1A9A

signature, which is stated to be a summary of operational activities for Francis Gary Powers, describing them in general and then listing actual flights by date, area, nature, and flying time. Can you tell me where this information could be obtained?

25X1A9A

Yes. This information was obtained from his Form 5 and from flight records that are available to us up in the office on H Street.

MR. HOUSTON: You would have the actual originals of those flight records?

25X1A9A

Yes, they are--

MR. HOUSTON: From which this information had been taken?

25X1A9A

Yes.

MR. HOUSTON: Judge, I suppose we could verify this further, but if you think that is an adequate identification, if it's acceptable to you I would propose to have this as an exhibit for the record.

25X1A2G

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25X1A9A

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JUDGE PRETTYMAN: Why don't you just put it in as an exhibit. I don't see any need for further verification of it. And if any questions should arise--

25X1A9A

MR. HOUSTON: You could always go to the original document.

25X1A9A

. . . . This SUMMARY OF OPERATIONAL ACTIVITIES from []

25X1A9A

[], Acting Chief, DFD-DD/P, addressed to [] dated 25X1A9A

19 February 1962, was then entered in the record as EXHIBIT 14

[] May I make another additional comment, which may be pertinent?

JUDGE PRETTYMAN: Yes.

25X1A9A

[] In addition to the flight maps which we placed on JN charts we did prepare for the pilots, on this scale map, a global navigation chart, an emergency map -- in event of emergency the pilot then would have a heading and fuel figures available, and time enroute, to all the various places as [] selected for us. And this map was not mounted on a board, and was made available to the pilot and which he carried folded in his flight coveralls. The pilots did assist in the making of this map, and Frank did have this with him at the time he took off.

25X1A9A

25X1A9A

[] For escape or evasion?

25X1A9A

[] Not escape and evasion, but supposing he runs into engine trouble and he wants to get out of Russia as soon as possible.

JUDGE PRETTYMAN: Could I ask you one or two questions about this, to make sure I understand it? Looking at Card No. 1, and turning over to Card No. 2,

25X1A2G

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25X1A9A

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it is written on here in crayon, with an arrow pointing to a certain point on the flight line, the words "Mode 1 on". Then further along the line the words "Mode Stby" -- which I assume means standby.

25X1A9A

☐

Yes, it means standby.

JUDGE PRETTYMAN: What does that mean?

25X1A9A

☐

Well, sir, that was for the operation of the camera.

And the camera had two modes that were available to us -- one mode is scanning from horizon to horizon--

JUDGE PRETTYMAN: I don't care about the details of it -- but this mode has something to do with the camera? It tells him to do something with the camera?

25X1A9A

☐

Yes, sir. And on his original flight log, then, I computed the time after take-off he was to do this, so that if he encountered an undercast then by dead reckoning he would turn the camera on, because there are times when they can get some photographic value even out of clouds.

JUDGE PRETTYMAN: Now this second one says "mode standby". Then the next thing that appears is on the next card - "Mode off" - "Mode Standby". I suppose then this standby means turn it off at that point?

25X1A9A

☐

It isn't really off, because they keep the heaters on so that the camera has heat, and ensures operation when he does go back, for turning it on.

JUDGE PRETTYMAN: But the points shown on here are the points at which you particularly wanted him to take a picture?

25X1A2G

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25X1A9A

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25X1A9A

Yes, sir.

MR. HOUSTON: That is where you were exposing film?

25X1A9A

Yes.

GENERAL BULL: I have noted in the Tape 1 recording of Mr. Powers'

interview this reference -- and he was talking here about the time after he had left the plane and was on the way down -- "I remembered that I had a map with escape - not escape routes but showing routes to - in a southern part of my course, showing routes from there to from various points along my course in case something happened and I had to come back out this way. So I took that out, tore it up into small pieces and just threw it out in the air." This was the sole reference to that. What would prompt that particular security action on his part? Was that probably the most important document he had, of a security nature -- anymore than this type of--

25X1A9A

I think it was one of the most important, because this map would have brought into the trial some of our allies who were allowing us to use their bases under emergency conditions. And by destroying this map, of course, he removed any evidence of this that could have been brought out when he was captured.

GENERAL BULL: Would it bring them in anymore than these maps he was using on this chart?

25X1A9A

Yes, because the only bases we show here is the

departure base at 25X1A6A and the base at 25X1A6A

MR. HOUSTON: The other map would show what, for instance?

25X1A6A

25X1A9A

It would show various bases in

25X1A2G

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25X1A9A

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along the southern border of the Soviet Union.

25X1A9A

25X1A6A
MR. HOUSTON: Would it show anything from to the north?

It did show on here two alternate bases in the north,
as did this map.

JUDGE PRETTYMAN: Let the record show: when he said "this map"

he was referring to the series of cards he has testified about.

25X1A9A

It is very difficult to predict over these great
distances the actual effect the wind will have on a flight. It is also difficult
to predict whether the fuel consumption will be as planned. Therefore, starting at

approximately Archangel we did have alternate routes across

25X1A6A
 in case at a certain point -- for example when he reached Archangel --
if his fuel was not as we had computed it, he could cut across. And these were on
the JN charts which he carried in the aircraft with him.

MR. HOUSTON: So by destroying that what he really protected was
indications of cooperation on the southern border?

25X1A9A

Yes.

GENERAL BULL: Would you say that was a sound and logical reaction
of a man trying to protect the security of the flight?

25X1A9A

I would say it was an excellent reaction.

25X1A9A

I would like to ask -- I think the testimony which we
have heard so far has been certainly confusing, and I think conflicting, as to whether
or not Mr. Powers had made previous overflights over Soviet bloc territory. Does the

25X1A2G

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25X1A9A

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record of his operational experience indicate that he had made a previous flight over Russia, or not?

MR. HOUSTON: The record indicates a total of 19 flights over the Middle East, and one flight over the USSR - photographic reconnaissance - in 1957.

25X1A9A

[] Now the records indicate -- the records that we had

25X1X4

25X1A6A

available -- that he took off from [] and flew across [] and about the point

he would be penetrating the Soviet Union his instructions were if he could not see a

large lake, due to cloud cover, he should return -- and this I believe is what

happened -- he was to return, and he did return because he could not see the checkpoint,

in accordance with the instructions as given to him.

25X1A9A

[] This is another flight -- apart from the flight flown in

1957?

MR. HOUSTON: This was the one in 1957.

25X1A9A

[] I'm a little confused as to whether there were two flights.

MR. HOUSTON: Only one over the USSR. This one was not a deep

penetration, because in accordance with his instructions he turned back when he saw

cloud cover over the area.

25X1A9A

[] This was not another flight -- the one over []

25X1X4

25X1X4

MR. HOUSTON: The one over [] first and he came back after he

reached the Soviet border?

25X1A9A

[] My understanding now is that the first overflight in

which Mr. Powers flew over Soviet territory was the flight flown on 1 May 1960.

25X1A2G

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25X1A9A

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MR. HOUSTON: That appears to be correct, from the records, yes.

25X1A9A

25X1A9A

. . . . [] then left the stand and []

was recalled as a witness and reminded that he was still under oath

25X1A9A

MR. HOUSTON: We called [] to identify a document.

25X1A9A

[] have here a document which I would like you

to take a look at and see if you can identify it.

25X1A9A

[] This is a document showing the summary of that mission.

MR. HOUSTON: You are personally familiar with this document?

[]: Yes.

25X1A9A

MR. HOUSTON: Did you prepare it?

25X1A9A

[] Yes -- I signed as preparing officer.

MR. HOUSTON: What signature is on that document?

25X1A9A

[] [] 25X1A2E

MR. HOUSTON: And is that your signature pseudonym assigned to you

by the Agency?

25X1A9A

[] That is correct.

MR. HOUSTON: When was this document prepared?

[] 27 May 1960.

25X1A9A

MR. HOUSTON: And what is the nature of the document?

25X1A9A

[] This is a summary of events that took place, in the
particular
order of their happening, concerning this/mission.

25X1A2G

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25X1A9A

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MR. HOUSTON: And the purpose of this summary was what? In other words, was this requested by Headquarters?

25X1A9A

Yes, this was a result of a request by Headquarters.

MR. HOUSTON: And this was an official dispatch to Headquarters?

25X1A9A

This is correct.

MR. HOUSTON: I'd like to submit this dispatch, as Exhibit 15, to the Board as a summary--

JUDGE PRETTYMAN: Let it be so marked and put in the record.

25X1A2G

. . . . Dispatch -3240, dated 27 May 1960, was then entered in the record as EXHIBIT 15

25X1A9A

JUDGE PRETTYMAN: Now, this is a report by you pursuant to an instruction from Headquarters?

25X1A9A

That is correct, sir.

JUDGE PRETTYMAN: Does this report contain only material known to you, or does it contain material that you gathered in an effort to prepare this report? In other words, did you interview other people, and what not?

25X1A9A

This is material gathered by all available sources.

JUDGE PRETTYMAN: Gathered by all available sources and put together by you for official purposes?

25X1A9A

Yes, sir.

25X1A2G

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25X1A9A

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GENERAL BULL: Would you call that your post-flight analysis of the flight, or evaluation of the flight?

25X1A9A No, sir, I wouldn't say that. I'd say that this is a summary of events that took place during this mission.

25X1A9A Not including the mission, though -- up to the point of take-off?

25X1A9A Yes, up to the point of take-off.

JUDGE PRETTYMAN: Only to the point of take-off?

25X1A9A Yes.

MR. HOUSTON: In effect, Judge, it summarizes much of the testimony we have had this morning -- the briefings that took place--

25X1A9A Well, it takes in, for instance, unusual personalities

25X1A6A that were in the area since 1 April -- of course, this is included in this.

JUDGE PRETTYMAN: But it only goes up to take-off time, is that right? It doesn't purport to contain anything that happened after take-off time?

25X1A9A This is true.

JUDGE PRETTYMAN: It doesn't show, for example, who might have said
25X1A6A what, or who was around, etc., at after the flight had taken off and been gone an hour or so?

25X1A9A What was the purpose of this? This was a security assessment, was it? - in effect?

25X1A2G

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25X1A9A

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25X1A9A

[] Of course, since May 27th of 1960 - it's hard to remember. All I can do is say the subject of this is a summary--

25X1A9A

[] I noticed you referred to the fact that the document included statements as to whether there were unusual people in the vicinity, and what not, and from that I gathered what Headquarters was interested in was if there was any evidence of attempts to get at Powers before the flight, or any unusual events which would influence people's judgment as to what might have happened on the flight.

25X1A9A

[] This I don't know.

MR. HOUSTON: It's a detailed chronology of events, and also a report of things and events that might or might not be related to the mission, that were developed after the mission.

25X1A9A

[] was one of the officials who helped prepare

25X1A9A

the request from Headquarters to [] He might be able to shed a little light on the Headquarters' need for the summary.

MR. HOUSTON: I don't know whether we need to go into that.

JUDGE PRETTYMAN: I want to make sure I understand this. As I understand it, we are looking at a paper now where the last account in it is the take-off of the flight from []

25X1A6A

MR. HOUSTON: No, sir. The last thing discussed here is an appraisal of Powers' intelligence knowledgesability. This is one of the peripheral subjects covered, in addition to the chronological order of events leading up to the take-off.

25X1A2G

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25X1A9A

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JUDGE PRETTYMAN: Then let's take the chronological order of events

leading up to the take-off -- at take-off this report stops, is that right?

25X1A9A

[] Let me read it -- the first paragraph is an

introduction, the second paragraph is sequence of events, the third paragraph is

briefings, the 4th is personal and professional equipment, the 5th is personnel

participating at staging areas, the 6th is Powers' personal factors, the 7th is unusual

25X1A6A

personalities in the [] area, the 8th is aircraft and fuel, the 9th is Powers'

intelligence knowledgeability, and paragraph 10 is conclusions.

JUDGE PRETTYMAN: Now my question is simply this. The flight took

25X1A6A

off at [] is that right?

25X1A9A

[] This is true.

JUDGE PRETTYMAN: And does this summary or this report contain

25X1A6A

anything about unusual characters around the flight take-off at [] I just

want to identify this document. I'm just curious to know whether Headquarters wanted

25X1A6A

a report on [] after the flight took off. I suppose there were some people

25X1A6A

there -- everybody didn't drop dead at [] -- what did they do? Did they wait

around? Did they all get on a plane? What happened? Something happened.

25X1A9A

[] This is not in this report.

JUDGE PRETTYMAN: That is the answer, then, to my question -- it's

not in this report.

25X1A9A

MR. HOUSTON: Would you like any testimony from [] on that

point?

25X1A2G

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25X1A9A

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JUDGE PRETTYMAN: Colonel, were you there?

25X1A9A

[] Yes, sir.

JUDGE PRETTYMAN: I would be interested in a very brief account of

what did take place after the flight took off. After the plane took off what did everybody do? What happened?

25X1A9A

[] Everyone then went to the hangar where we had our

lodging, etc., that we had stayed in the previous time. We stayed there and started preparing our fly-away kits for the trip back to home base, at the same time waiting for instructions as to when and where we would go. These kits were loaded on the support aircraft. This take a period of one to two hours to load up. And everyone then remained in the general vicinity of the aircraft waiting for instructions to return to home base.

JUDGE PRETTYMAN: Was there a base detachment that stayed there at

25X1A6A

[]

25X1A9A

MR. HOUSTON: You mean a permanent--

25X1A6A

[] Permanently? No -- not from our base. Now there is

a [] - a base is what it is, and it's a fighter base and of course they

25X1A6A

have permanent people there. But none of our people from [] my unit, were there permanently.

MR. HOUSTON: You just go in for the purposes of the mission?

25X1A9A

[] It's just a staging base.

JUDGE PRETTYMAN: Now when your Detachment took off for home --

25X1A2G

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25X1A9A

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25X1A6A

what kind of a detachment, composed of whom, was left there at []

25X1A9A

[] No one.

JUDGE PRETTYMAN: I thought you just said--
25X1A9A

25X1A6A

[] It's a []

25X1A9A

[] It belongs to [] and there is a permanent

25X1A6A

base for them, so it's maintained by the []

25X1A6A

JUDGE PRETTYMAN: When you left they were still there?

25X1A9A

[] As far as I know they were, yes, sir.

JUDGE PRETTYMAN: That detachment saw this flight take off?

25X1A9A

[] I wouldn't say it was a detachment -- it was a

base complement of people.

JUDGE PRETTYMAN: The base complement of people -- they saw the

flight?

25X1A9A

[] Which flight? The one that Powers took off? I

have to assume that some people did, yes.

JUDGE PRETTYMAN: There was no effort made by anybody, as far as

25X1A6A

you know, to ascertain whether there at [] in this base complement there were

any odd people or any odd occurrences, or anything of that sort?

25X1A9A

[] Well--

COL. GEARY: Judge, I may be able to shed some light on that, if I may?

JUDGE PRETTYMAN: It just arose in my mind because Headquarters was

25X1A6A

very anxious to get a report on any odd characters around [] -- I just wondered

25X1A2G

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25X1A9A

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25X1A6A

if they were also interested in who might have been around [] -- since this

flight had been in preparation for a number of days - I mean, the plane had been

25X1A6A

ferried over to [] four, five or six times -- whether there was any interest

in whether there was a possibility that somebody had it all set up there to notify

somebody when this man took off?

COL. GEARY: That is a possibility you can never discount under the

circumstances.

25X1A9A

[]

I would like to say this, that from the time that

25X1A6A

25X1A6A

this Detachment left [] until the time that it arrived back at [] that both

me and the security people who were along with the Detachment were on guard for

any unusual activity or personnel that might be involved. There was a limited number

of contacts with base people, and I personally did the majority of these. The other

people of my Detachment stayed within the small hangar area. So if there had been

any unusual personalities within that general area, then we would have discovered this,

I feel sure of this, from a security standpoint. Now if they had been on another

part of the base, then we would know nothing of this.

25X1A9A

[]

I think the question that immediately occurs is whether

25X1A6A

25X1A6A

or not some member of the [] or the other [] in the neighborhood

or in the area could have, having seen this flight take off, communicated this fact

to the Soviets or elsewhere without our knowing about it?

25X1A9A

[]

I'm sure it could have.

25X1A2G

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25X1A9A

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25X1A9A

[] It's possible?

25X1A9A

[] Yes, it's possible, I'm sure.

25X1A9A

. . . . [] was then excused from the witness stand,

25X1A9A and [] was called as a witness and duly sworn by Judge Prettyman . . .

25X1A9A

MR. HOUSTON: Would you identify yourself for the record?

25X1A9A

[] I am [] United States Air Force,

25X1A9A

Medical Corps, []

25X1A9A

MR. HOUSTON: Would you inform the Board of your participation in

your assignment to the U-2 Program?

[] I was assigned to the Program in November of 1958, I
25X1A6A

went overseas the 1st of December, arrived in [] as I recall, about the 5th of
December, and I was constantly on duty with the unit from that time until August
of 1960.

MR. HOUSTON: Before you went over were you indoctrinated back here

in the Program?

25X1A9A

[] Yes, sir -- a Headquarters' briefing.

MR. HOUSTON: Including briefing on any special medical implications

of the Program?

25X1A9A

[] I was aware -- after I had been briefed by Headquarters

25X1A2G

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25X1A9A

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as to the kind of operation that was being carried out it was evident -- because I had had some experience in the field of high altitude support already, past experience, so there would have been no special problems to me from the medical aspect.

MR. HOUSTON: Would this be your understanding - this was one reason for your selection, you had had prior experience in this?

25X1A9A

[] I believe so, sir. 25X1A6A

MR. HOUSTON: When you arrived at [] Mr. Powers was there at that time?

25X1A9A

[] Yes.

MR. HOUSTON: And from that time on until the mission at the end of April you were the medical officer who would be responsible for recommending or reporting on Mr. Powers' physical condition?

25X1A9A

[] Yes, sir.

MR. HOUSTON: Did you conduct frequent examinations, or how did you keep abreast of his physical condition?

25X1A9A

[] Well, it was a very small unit I was supporting, and the arrangements were informal, but I had daily contact with all of the pilots -- I was available to them at all times, 24 hours a day, and I'm sure that I had at least daily contact with every one of the pilots.

MR. HOUSTON: Would you make special examinations or tests before they engaged in a mission?

25X1A2G

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25X1A9A

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25X1A9A

☐ I saw the pilot usually something like 12 to 18 hours before every mission launch time, at which time we had a short conversation, generally just dealing with his health status, whether he had any problems that he was aware of, and I'd usually do a brief EEG examination, and this would again be repeated prior to the time he would start his pre-breathing, which was two hours prior to launch time.

MR. HOUSTON: You would accompany the pilots to the staging area?

25X1A9A

☐ On some occasions, yes.

MR. HOUSTON: Did you on this occasion?

25X1A9A

☐ Yes.

MR. HOUSTON: So you attended him during the pre-breathing?

25X1A9A

☐ Yes, I attended him constantly.

MR. HOUSTON: Did you also have responsibility for their mental and emotional status?

25X1A9A

☐ That would be part of my observational responsibility, to be able to make a medical assessment of such.

MR. HOUSTON: Could you give the Board a medical assessment of Mr. Powers' physically and emotionally, in general, and then specifically your opinion of him at the time you last saw him before the take-off on this May 1 mission?

25X1A9A

☐ Mr. Powers was in excellent physical health during the time that I knew him, and I considered him an extremely stable individual emotionally. I had no reason to change my opinion up to the moment of launch-time.

25X1A2G

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25X1A9A

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MR. HOUSTON: I have no further questions.

JUDGE PRETTYMAN: No questions. Thank you, sir.

25X1A9A

. . . . [] was then excused from the witness

stand

JUDGE PRETTYMAN: Mr. Houston, these four cards which were

25X1A9A

discussed by the witness [] -- they were not put in the record. Do you
think they should be?

MR. HOUSTON: I'm sorry - this was an oversight. I meant to ask

the Board whether they did want them in the record.

25X1A9A

[] I'm not clear exactly what they are.

25X1A9A

[] They are a reproduction of the actual mission.

25X1A9A

[] When was it reproduced?

25X1A9A

[] Within the past week. For security reasons we only

ever prepared one -- and this Frank took with him.

JUDGE PRETTYMAN: You prepared one set and he took that with him on

the flight. Do you know what happened to that?

25X1A9A

[] The Russians have it -- parts of it.

JUDGE PRETTYMAN: Now how did you prepare this duplicate set?

25X1A9A

[] By going back to the messages that gave the track

25X1A6A
from []

25X1A2G

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25X1A9A

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JUDGE PRETTYMAN: In other words, you couldn't copy the original
but these were reconstructed?

MR. HOUSTON: You went through the same process this time that you
25X1A6A

had done originally in ☐

25X1A9A

☐ Yes.

25X1A9A

☐ You still have in your files the original Headquarters

directive, and this was reconstructed from that original Headquarters' directive?

25X1A9A

☐ Yes.

JUDGE PRETTYMAN: I think you might state that in the record --

25X1A9A

identify them as four documents, by Exhibit number, and then describe them as ☐

25X1A9A

☐ described them, as reconstructed from the original--

MR. HOUSTON: Four documents, listed as EXHIBIT 16-A, B, C, and D,
25X1A6A 25X1A6A

which are maps of the area from ☐ across Russia to ☐ and on the maps

are traced courses for the flight of May 1. The originals of these maps not being

available, these courses were reconstructed from the original data, which was also

used to construct the original ones used by Mr. Powers. They therefore duplicate

the material taken by Mr. Powers on his mission. There were, however, on the originals

the notes made by the pilot, Mr. Powers, at the time of his briefing, which notes

are not included in these Exhibits.

25X1A9A

JUDGE PRETTYMAN: I think we might add there, Mr. Houston, that it's

☐ testimony that except for the exception you have just noted, these

cards do reflect accurately the cards that were given to Mr. Powers prior to the May 1, 1960,
flight.

25X1A2G

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25X1A9A

[] The celestial computations are not on those cards,
the radio annotations are not on those cards, and the emergency routes cutting
off from Archangel and Murmansk and alternates to the northern base are not on
those cards. But the route is accurate.

JUDGE PRETTYMAN: And with the exceptions you have just noted,
they are otherwise accurate reproductions?

25X1A9A [] Yes.

. . . . The meeting recessed for lunch at 1:00 p.m.

Judge Prettyman announced that the Board would reconvene

25X1A9A

at 2:00 p.m. to hear the testimony of []

25X1A9A []

25X1A2G

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